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Prediction and retrodiction in Boltzmann's approach to classical statistical mechanics






In this paper we address two problems in Boltzmann's approach to statistical mechanics. The first is the justification of the probabilistic predictions of the theory. And the second is the inadequacy of the theory's retrodictions.






I-1 Macrostates. Here is the Boltzmannian set up of classical statistical mechanics as we think about it. Consider Figure 1. 
The phase space of the universe is divided into the accessible and inaccessible regions, according to some parameters of the universe, such as its total energy and perhaps some other constants of the motion and space time structure.​[2]​ In general, it is the task of cosmological theories to tell us how to characterize the accessible region of the universe.
We further divide the phase space of the universe into subsets of points called macrostates. Each such carving up is a macroscopic mode of description of microstates. The macrostates are pairwise disjoint and together they cover all the points in the phase space (in particular, in the accessible region), such that each point belongs to some macrostate and no point belongs to more than one macrostate. In what follows we shall be especially interested in the carving up of the phase space that corresponds to thermodynamic magnitudes. In what follows we consider some crucial features of this carving up of the phase space and its relation to the dynamics of the universe. We don't go into the question of whether the thermodynamic carving up depends on the dynamics of the universe (or any subsystem of it). 

I-2 The -1st law. As argued by Uffink and Brown (2001) the time-asymmetry in thermodynamics first appears in a law stating the approach to equilibrium, or what they call the -1st law. According to this law, a thermodynamic system which is subject to some constant external constraints evolves in time spontaneously and deterministically into a unique thermodynamic state called the equilibrium state, and remains in that state indefinitely. The constancy of constraints is what distinguishes this law from the 2nd law of thermodynamics which we discuss below. 
In the case of ideal gases the division of the phase space to thermodynamic macrostates corresponds to the standard Boltzmannian combinatorial considerations (given a uniform probability measure over μ-space). Following Boltzmann we define the entropy of a microstate as proportional to the log of the phase space volume (given by the standard Lebesgue measure) of the macrostate to which it belongs. One of the macrostates takes up almost the entirety of the accessible region and is called equilibrium (E in Figure 1). A phase space trajectory can be described at the macro level as a time series of the macrostates through which it passes in the course of time. Boltzmann conjectured that the relative frequency of each macrostate in this time series, as time approaches infinity, is equal to the relative phase space volume as determined by the standard measure. Therefore, the system is overwhelmingly likely (by the standard probability measure) to be found at every moment of time in equilibrium, regardless of its previous macrostate. By this Boltzmann provided a statistical mechanical counterpart of the -1st law, except that in his account there are fluctuations away from equilibrium. As is well known there is ample evidence of fluctuation phenomena, and in this sense Boltzmann's probabilistic account is closer to experience than the -1st law of thermodynamics. 
What is the justification for this law, and specifically for Boltzmann's conjecture that the probability of finding the system in a given macrostate is proportional to its standard measure in the phase space? 

I-3 The Dynamical hypothesis. We propose the following hypothesis about the distribution of possible phase space trajectories of the universe, and then argue that it is necessary in order to justify the probabilistic predictions of statistical mechanics in the Boltzmannian approach. In the last section of this paper we shall discuss whether it is also sufficient to underwrite the Boltzmannian statistical predictions.





It turns out that this DH is not sufficient to underwrite (not even statistically) the predictions of thermodynamics for reasons we shall see below. In particular, it cannot secure with high probability the typical paths that normal thermodynamic evolutions take on their way to equilibrium. Boltzmann proved that a system is overwhelmingly likely to end up in the equilibrium macrostate (E in Figure 1), since this macrostate corresponds to a stable extremum of the magnitude that Botzmann studied; but from the extremum proof nothing follows concerning the intermediate stages, on the route to equilibrium. In particular, it does not follow that the path is like to exhibit a more or less monotonous increase of entropy. This situation entails that the DH as just stated must be supplemented with the particular local dynamics of our universe that yields our thermodynamic experience. (We think that this shortcoming of Boltzmann's approach holds even if one postulates in addition to the DH the standard uniform probability measure over initial conditions; in our approach we do not and need not postulate this.). 
[Note that the DH is much weaker than ergodicity (metric indecomposability) since the latter implies that the trajectory of the system arrives to any positive measure set in the phase space from any point. See below.]
In the simple (but stronger) case in which DH holds, the trajectories that start out in M at t=0 end up at t=T in points which are approximately (or coarsely or roughly) uniformly distributed over the whole accessible region (Figure 2 illustrates this case). In this approximately uniform distribution, in any region A of R which isn't too small (by the standard measure) there are end points of trajectories that arrive from any (local) macrostate M, and the measure of points at t=T which are end points of trajectories which have started out in M at t=0 is equal to μ(M) times μ(A)/ μ(R). In what follows we shall focus on the approximately uniform distribution case for simplicity only. 
[Note that in fact all that's needed to get the Boltzmannian probabilities is that the DH behavior of the trajectories will be true for sub regions corresponding to thermodynamic magnitudes (i.e. some macrostates that correspond to thermodynamic observables).] 
The main statistical postulate in the standard presentation of the Boltzmannian approach is that there is a uniform probability distribution over the present accessible region and in particular over the present macrostate of the system or over the initial macrostate at some t=0. The DH (in the simple case of approximately or coarsely uniform distribution) gives a dynamical justification for this postulate. The coarsely uniform probability distribution over the present macrostate is a consequence of applying the DH to a macrostate in some appropriate past (which could actually be not very far from the present). Therefore the DH in our reconstruction justifies the usual statistical postulates concerning the uniform probability distribution over some past or present macrostates. Any statistical assertions that are needed in order to derive the Boltzmannian predictions follow logically from the DH (as we shall see below), and in particular the DH in the simple case entails also Boltzmann's central conjecture according to which probability is measured by phase space volume (in the standard measure).
The advantages of the DH over the standard presentation are conceptual: we prefer making dynamical conjectures, rather than talking about probability distributions over phase space, whose origin and meaning are not clear to us.
Note that the DH is time reversal invariant if the dynamics is time reversal invariant (in Figure 2 this is illustrated by the distribution of trajectories from M both towards the future, upwards, and towards the past, downwards). Therefore, the DH by itself does not solve the minimum problem in classical statistical mechanics. As we will see below, the recovery of time a-symmetry in statistical mechanics will be done solely by our hypotheses about past events (see the PH and the GPH below).   

I-4 Liouville's theorem. In the above account of the DH (and of the -1st law) there is a point that needs special attention due to Liouville's theorem. Suppose that a system subjected to some fixed external constrains is known to be in the low entropy macrostate M and that it evolves to some other macrostate N which is larger in volume than M. Conservation of phase volume (Liouville's theorem) immediately implies that the end points of the trajectories that started out in M can only cover a small fraction of N. This means that at any given time most (as defined by the standard measure) of the points in N don't correspond to the actual macroscopic history of the system. We call this set of points non-historical. The historical set of microstates (in N) consists of those points which correspond to the actual macroscopic history of the system (i.e., those that have started out in M). It is crucial to realize that the DH as stated above is independent of whether we take only the historical points in M (i.e. those that have reached M from the actual past macrosatates; this history is not illustrated in Figure 2) or all the points in M. If we consider all the points in M, then these points will be coarsely spread all over the accessible region by time T; and if we consider on the historical points in M (which take up only a small volume of M), then these points will be coarsely spread over all the accessible region by time T; in both cases, the relative fraction of end points at T will correspond to the relative measure of the different macrostates.
This last point immediately raises the following question. The Boltzmannian predictions are based on phase volume of the macrostates without distinguishing between the historical and the non-historical points. Why are they successful? The answer follows from the DH. The end points of the historical trajectories that start out in M spread over the whole accessible region after a short time (as determined by the dynamics). So the DH implies that the probability distribution over the future accessible macrostates is determined by their volume. Therefore it follows that predictions based on Boltzmanian macrostates only are indistinguishable from predictions based only on the historical points. This is desirable since the macrostates in the thermodynamic grid over the phase space might be taken to express our finest measurement capabilities, and normally we cannot in practice distinguish between the historical and the non-historical points. 
In our reconstruction of the foundations of statistical mechanics (in this paper), when we talk about a uniform probability distribution (given the standard Lebesgue measure) we mean only some probability distribution that coarsely approximates the uniform one on the standard measure, in the sense that the probability of a thermodynamic macrostate is proportional to its volume. The DH is about the thermodynamic macrostates, and it does not imply that the probability for finding the system in any volume of phase space is proportional to its volume. In this sense, we conjecture that there is a very important and close connection between the dynamics of the universe and the way in which we divide the phase space into macrostates. (We address the origins of this connection elsewhere.) 
Because of the weak nature of our DH,  we don't require the Lebesgue measure but only any probability measure that is absolutely continuous with it (i.e. agrees with it for the extreme cases of sets of measure zero and one). Any such measure will be enough in order to underwrite our DH and PH. We don't need a specific probability measure. (We take this to be another advantage of our approach.)

I-5 Anti-thermodynamic trajectories (Grue 1). According to the usual Boltzmannian considerations the measure of initial states in the phase space leading to anti-thermodynamic trajectories in the future is zero. However, given any present macrostate, we cannot distinguish between the set of points leading to anti-thermodynamic trajectories and the set of points leading to normal entropy increasing trajectories towards the future. Therefore we have no reason to suppose that the DH will not hold also for the anti-thermodynamic set of points. And so we conjecture that the anti-thermodynamic points are uniformly scattered among the thermodynamic points. This means that the present macrostate together with the DH can only give us statistical predictions about the thermodynamic behavior in the future, which do not differ from the standard Boltzmannian predictions. We can only infer that the probability for entropy increase in the future is overwhelmingly high. No further macroscopic observations of thermodynamic magnitudes can improve our statistical predictions, not even if we add the complete knowledge concerning the entire macroscopic trajectory (the thermodynamic history) of the universe up to the present. 
We like to think of this result as a case of Nelson Goodman's grue thought experiment, which turns out to be not a paradox but part of statistical mechanics. (We call this the grue 1 case; another case of grue will be presented below). In Goodman's grue "paradox", there are two hypotheses concerning emeralds: one is that they are all green, and the other is that they are all grue, namely: green if observed up to time T and blue otherwise. All the observations we can possibly make up to T cannot distinguish between the two hypotheses and equally confirm them. Similarly, consider two phase space trajectories which have an identical macroscopic thermodynamic history up to time T, and thereafter – one of them is thermodynamically "normal" and the other is entropy decreasing. No thermodynamic observations up to T can distinguish between the two. Thermodynamics tells us that the actual trajectory of the universe is the "normal" one; but Botlzmann's statistical mechanics allows for the two cases and renders them indistinguishable and equally confirmed by observations, in the grue sense of the term.

I-6 Justification of the DH. We now argue that the DH as just stated is necessary in order to justify the probabilistic predictions of statistical mechanics in the Boltzmannian approach (where we assume that probabilistic explanation requires typicality relative to a probability measure; see below).​[3]​ In particular the DH is necessary in order to justify the Boltzmannian conjecture that probability is measured by phase space volume (given the standard measure). 
Note to begin with that the DH is minimal in the sense that it requires an approximately or coarsely uniform distribution of trajectories only relative to the thermodynamic grid (i.e. relative to the partition of phase space into thermodynamic macrostates) . However, it might be that the actual dynamics of the universe satisfies also the stronger condition that the trajectories are coarsely uniformly distributed relative to some other grids which are unknown or even seem meaningless to us. But we don't require this stronger condition, since it is not needed in order to justify the recovery of the thermodynamic predictions. 
Consider now why the DH is necessary in order to justify dynamically the Boltzmannian conjecture that probability is measured by phase space volume. It is easy to see this by considering alternative dynamical hypotheses which are incompatible with the DH. 
Here is one example. Suppose that the initial conditions of the possible trajectories of the universe, starting out at some preferred time in the past (e.g. the initial 'big bang' macrostate), were uniformly distributed over the whole accessible region at that moment. But unlike the DH suppose that this uniform distribution is postulated to have taken place for this (preferred) time only rather than for every time. Call this hypothesis the one-shot hypothesis. Under the one-shot hypothesis it is possible that the end points of the trajectories at some other time (say the present, or some future time) will not be uniformly distributed over the accessible region. In this case it might be, for example, that most or even all of the trajectories starting out in the present macrostate will be locked in the future in some sub region of the phase space. In that case, even if the Botzmannian conjecture that probability is given by phase space volume would be confirmed by experiments in the future, this would seem a miracle from the macro-dynamical point of view. In other words, the one-shot hypothesis is insufficient to justify the usual Boltzmannian probabilistic predictions, and in particular it cannot underwrite the conjecture that probability is measured by phase space volume (in the Lesbegue measure).





I-7 Ergodicity and the DH. Consider the logical relation between the DH and ergodicity (or metric indecompoability). Look at Figure 3. Suppose that the dynamics of a given system is ergodic. This means in the standard phase space picture that (i) for almost all points a (e.g., a1, a2 etc.) and for every positive measure sub region A the trajectory to which a belongs passes through A. And (ii) there is a measure zero set of points b such that for every point in this set there is some positive measure sub region B such that the trajectory to which b belongs does not pass through B. (b and B are not indicated in Figure 3.) Let us translate this definition to a temporal picture. Consider some arbitrary time slice t=0. (i) The trajectories that start out at t=0 in almost all the phase points a in the accessible phase space region (e.g., a1 and a2 in Figure 3) will be mapped to the sub region A at some other time slice t=1, 2 etc.; and (ii) There are some points b at t=0 and some sub regions B such that b will never be mapped to any point in B. (b and B do not appear in Figure 3.) This is the meaning of ergodicity in a time sliced picture. 
The DH is logically weaker than ergodicity in some respects, and stronger in other respect. First let's see in what sense it is weaker. To see why consider a sequence of two time slices t=0 and t=1  (where the time interval (0, 1) is fixed by the time scale over which the thermodynamic magnitudes in question change), and take any phase space regions A and M that correspond to thermodynamic macrostates. Then according to the DH there are trajectories starting out in points in M at t=0 that will end up in points in A at t=1. The measure of the points that have started out in M and have ended up in A is approximately proportional to the product μ (A) times μ(M). In other words, the DH requires that (i) among the trajectories that start out in M at t=0 there are some that reach A at t=1 and not at any other time; and (ii) conversely, among the trajectories that reach A at t=1 there will be some that arrive from M at t=0 and not from any other region. The DH is logically weaker than ergodicity because it only requires the said behavior of trajectories for subregions A and M that correspond to thermodynamic macrostates. Had we require the behavior to be satisfied with respect to any positive measure subregions A and M we would get in fact a condition that implies ergodicity. (in both cases the time interval must be long enough; this condition is dictated by the classical dynamics.)
Having seen in what sense the DH is weaker than ergodicity, let's see now in what sense the DH is stronger than ergodicity. Here is another way to see why the DH is necessary. Suppose that a system starts out in some macrostate A. And suppose that the dynamics of the system is not ergodic. According to KAM's theorem this is the typical case for mechanical systems. However, the regions into which the accessible region is decomposed by the dynamics are ergodic, since the dynamics is measure preserving.​[4]​ Call such regions dynamically accessible. So here we get ergodicity in the dynamically accessible regions, as it were, for free. Is it enough in order to yield for finite times the correct (Boltzmannian) probabilistic predictions relative to these regions? The answer is a clear cut no. As is well known, ergodicity does not ensure (even probabilistically) the thermodynamic behaviour for the time intervals that we experience (see for example Earman and Redei 1996, their Gibbsian considerations are relevant for the present point). The DH is meant to ensure exactly this, and this is why the DH incorporates the idea that the time interval during which the trajctories spread over the accessible region is determined by the dynamics of the specific system in question. In this sense the DH is necessary and it is stronger than ergodicity. However, this seems to us completely unproblematic since in the models for which ergodicity has been demonstrated, the dynamics was actually Bernoulli which is stronger than the DH. The DH is stronger than ergodicity and weaker than Bernoulli in the sense that it yields uniform distribution of the trajectories after a finite time interval, not only in the infinite limit as in ergodicity, and not immediately as in Bernoulli. Note that if the correct dynamical hypothesis were invariably Bernoulli, then we would expect, for example, ice cubes to melt in room temperature immediately. In the DH as stated above the time interval required for the uniform distribution in the future depends on the dynamics of the physical system in question.​[5]​    
 [To see why the DH entails ergodicity, suppose that the dynamics is not ergodic. Then the phase space of the system is decomposable into dynamically disconnected regions. This means that the end points which start out in A will not be uniformly distributed over the whole accessible region for all times in the future. In particular, there will be regions in the phase space to which the trajectories that start out in A will never reach. Therefore, if ergodicity fails the DH fails. So the DH entails ergodicity. To see why ergodicity does not entail the DH, suppose that the DH fails for a certain finite time interval. In this case ergodicity can hold and nevertheless the Boltzmannian predictions will not be dynamically justified in the following sense. If the DH fails, the Boltzmannian probability will not match the typical relative frequencies (or the typical distribution of the trajectories) as we argued above. But this does not entail that there must be regions which are dynamically disconnected at the infinite time as the failure of ergodicity implies. Therefore the failure of the DH does not entail the failure of ergodicity (i.e. ergodicity does not entail the DH).]

I-8 Further implications of the DH. The DH also solves another problem in the Boltzmannian approach. In experience we often find systems which seem to behave in a way that does not correspond to the Boltzmannian probabilities (which are given by phase space volume). For example, Albert (2000) considers what we might call the spatulas problem. Spatulas are usually found in kitchen drawers and nowhere else, despite the fact that the phase space volume associated with kitchen drawers is very small. Given the DH the answer is this. The rate at which the approach to equilibrium of a given system occurs over time depends on the details of the dynamics of the system. For example, gas spreads over almost all of its accessible volume in a normal room within seconds; ice cubes melt in warm water within minutes; people decay into ashes within years; buildings and cities decay into dust within centuries; etc. 
The "spatulas problem" involves two kinds of errors. 
(1) The "purely probabilistic explanation" error. The macroscopic evolution of a system is determined by its dynamics, and this dynamics dictates that the system must pass through intermediate stages, between the initial and final stages. This trivial point is often overlooked. Take a system that starts out in some initial low entropy macrostate L (ice cube), passes through a medium entropy macrostate M (half melted ice cube), and ends up in the equilibrium macrostate E (water). Now suppose that we wanted to predict  the evolution from L onwards by using probabilistic considerations only (no dynamics). In that case we would predict that the system will evolve to E directly and instantly, not via M. An ice cube would turn into water instantly, without passing through the half-melted ice cube stage. Alternatively, if we wanted to explain the path via M using probabilistic considerations only, we would have to say that the probability of M (if the system is in L) is larger than the probability of E (if the system is in L), which goes against the Boltzmannian ideas. The trivial solution is that the system will go from L to M (and not directly to E) because its dynamics dictates this, and regardless of the fact that the measure of E is larger than the measure of M. The probabilistic considerations will only dictate the nature and stability of the final, equilibrium state. 
(2) the "time scales" error. One might apply the time scale which is appropriate for one sort of system (e.g. ice cubes in water) to system with very different dynamics (e.g. spatulas in kitchen drawers). Spatulas (or parts thereof) will be found all over the place after the appropriate time interval – for example, once we and our houses and our cities will decay. The DH takes these time scales into account explicitly.

I-9 The thermodynamic grid. The DH makes plausible the fact that by natural selection we observe the world through the thermodynamic grid and not any other. Note that one can identify the thermodynamic grid by the behavior of the trajectories, i.e. whether or not they behave as DH dictates. But nevertheless the DH in itself does not entail that the only possible grid is the thermodynamic one. At the same time it is correct that given the DH there is an advantage to creatures equipped with measuring capabilities corresponding to the thermodynamic grid. For such creatures statistical mechanical calculations turn out to be relatively simple and compact while extremely informative, since they are based on a uniform distribution. Creatures with other grids which do not match the DH as ours are still possible, but for them it seems that predictions might be extremely difficult. 
This last point has further implications concerning the logical supervenience of macrophysics in general and statistical mechanics in particular on the microphysics and the a-posteriori nature of macrophysics. Although macrophysics logically supervenes on the microphysics (and therefore macrophysics is logically fixed by the underlying microphysical truths about the world) there is no a-priori entailment from the microphysical truths to the macrophysical regularities. In this sense thermodynamics can be statistically reduced to statistical mechanics since the thermodynamic grid itself (and the so-called bridge laws of statistical mechanics) can be derived from the microphysical structure of observers like us and from the structure of our micro-dynamical interactions with the world.

I-10 The 2nd law. As we saw in the -1st law, for any fixed external constraints on a given thermodynamic system, there is a unique equilibrium state in the region accessible to the system. Since the 2nd law of thermodynamics says that the entropy of a system generally increases as it evolves from one equilibrium state to another, it follows that the 2nd law must refer to a change of external constraints. Let us now spell out the Boltzmannian counterpart of the 2nd law. Roughly speaking, Boltzmann's statistical counterpart of the -1st law ensures that the system starts out in equilibrium under the first set of constraints, and then after the constraints are changed the system again approaches equilibrium with high probability according to the -1st law. Note that the macrostate which is the equilibrium state under the first set of constraints is in general a non equilibrium state under the second set of constraints. In normal thermodynamic evolutions, the second equilibrium state has a larger phase space volume (see Figure 4), and therefore entropy increases towards the future, in (statistical) accordance with the 2nd law of thermodynamics.
	
Since the equilibrium state takes up almost the entirety of the accessible region, saying that the second equilibrium state has a larger phase space volume means, in fact, that the volume of the accessible region increases. Note that in both the initial and final states the system is in equilibrium (as demanded by the 2nd law of thermodynamics), and this means in statistical mechanics that both states have essentially the same high probability, despite the fact that the initial macrostate has smaller volume than the final one. Here we distinguish between entropy which is proportional to the log of the volume of the system's macrostate and the probability of that macrostate which is given by the ratio between the entropy and the volume of the accessible region. In these terms, according to the 2nd law the entropy of the system increases over time, while the probability of its macrostate is practically unchanged. 
These notions are sometimes called, respectively, absolute and relative entropy. The notion of absolute entropy is subject to the Gibbs paradox (see Reichenbach 195???, p. 61ff). On the other hand the notion of relative entropy (our probability above), which is not subject to the paradox leads to the conclusion that entropy decreases when the volume of the accessible region increases (say, when some constraints are lifted). In our opinion, the additivity of entropy in thermodynamics assumes that matter is continuous, where for example a partition between two chambers containing continuous gas can be removed and replaced without changing the state of the gas. The Gibbs paradox brings out the particulate nature of matter in statistical mechanics. However, in statistical mechanics the violation of additivity of absolute entropy expresses the fact that replacing the partition does not in general bring the gas back to its initial state. For a typical many particle gas the initial and final states will be the same with only small probability, and so it seems to us that in general additivity need not be imposed in statistical mechanics.
Consider in more detail how this reconstruction of the 2nd law bears on the notion of probability sketched above. As can be seen, Boltzmann's conjecture that phase space volumes match relative frequencies works only for fixed external constraints, i.e. for the -1st law. When the external constraints on a system are changed and with them the accessible region in the phase space, the event space with respect to which we construe the above notion of probability changes as well. Therefore the change of constraints implies that we need to start a new counting of relative frequencies. In other words, we treat a change of constraints as if we start a new series of states, and then we use Boltzmann's conjecture to predict the new relative frequencies and test them against experiments. 
Note that it is the temporal phase space picture as depicted in Figure 4 that gives a rigorous explanation of the 2nd law as opposed to the -1st law. In the standard phase space picture it is difficult to accommodate a change of the accessible region over time. The temporal picture emphasizes the different role played by the accessible region versus the macrostates regions in the Boltzmannian picture. Moreover, as we will see below, it gives a clear description of how the time a-symmetry gets into the theory. 

II. The Past Hypothesis 

We now turn to considering the second problem in the Boltzmannian approach, namely how to get, from statistical mechanics, the right time-asymmetry which is so central to our experience and which is expressed in thermodynamics. We want the retrodictions given by statistical mechanics to be compatible with our memories of the past. The Boltzmannian statistical postulates as construed up to now together with the time reversal classical dynamics (including the DH which is time reversal invariant) does not provide this desideratum. This theory entails that the present entropy of the universe is (probably) lower than it has been in the past and in the future; and this is the case for any point of time which we may take to be "the present". This is in stark contradiction to our memories. How can we fix this?

II-1 Memories. All the tools required for solving the problem are already present in our above Boltzmannian reconstruction. Figure 5 illustrates the phase space of a system at three moments of time t=-1, 0, +1, where t=0 denotes the present, t=-1 the past about which we have some memories, and t=+1 is some future time about which we make predictions. S is an isolated system consisting of an ice cube in water inside a thermos. Let us consider three possible macrostates of S. N is the equilibrium state of S which corresponds to cool water only. M is the macrostate corresponding to a half melted ice cub in warm water. And L is the state corresponding to an ice cube floating in water. For the sake of simplicity we suppose that the constraints on S are fixed at all times, and therefore the system is described fully by the -1st law. At t=0 (present) we find the system in M, and we remember that at t=-1 it was in L. In the Boltzmannian approach, it is highly probable that S will evolve at time t=+1 into N. Similarly, by this approach, it is highly probable that S was in N at t=-1, contrary to our memories. In other words, it is highly probably that the present state, if it is of low entropy, is a point of minimum entropy. This is the minimum problem. 
We now have to make a decision as to which statement about the past macrostate of S is the correct one: the statement by our present memories or the statement by the Boltzmannian approach. We choose to prefer our present memories (see below as to why this is the only reasonable option). And so we put forward the following general Past Hypothesis (following Albert 2000, Ch. 4) about the correlations between our memories and records of past events and the past events as follows.
The Past Hypothesis (PH): The present memories and records that we now have are reliable. This means that we believe that they reflect the actual macrostates in the past, of systems that were accessible to our direct observation in the past and those about which we have records. (This hypothesis reflects a general attitude of confidence in our memories and records, but it does not rule our mistakes.) ​[6]​
(Prior to the PH we perhaps ought to add the hypothesis that our sense impressions are reliable indications for the matters of fact in the world, in normal circumstances.) 
The PH immediately implies that the actual universe sits on one of the trajectories which pass through the macrostate we observe at present, and which in their past passed through the macrostates corresponding to our present memories and records. Call these trajectories historical. Historical trajectories, by construction, correspond to the thermodynamic regularities in the past which fit our experience. However, since the PH does not select trajectories according to their future behavior, there need not be any correlations between the thermodynamic behavior towards the past (the historical trajectories) and thermodynamic behavior towards the future. In the context of the DH we assumed that – in each time slice – the points that sit on anti-thermodynamic trajectories towards the future are coarsely uniformly scattered over the whole accessible region. We now add the hypothesis that this hypothesis holds also among the historical trajectories: for any given time slice (e.g., the present), consider the points that sit on historical trajectories in the past (call it the historical set of points on the present time slice); among them there are points that give rise to anti-thermodynamic evolution towards the future (call it the anti-thermodynamic set of points on the present time slice); the claim is that, the anti-thermodynamic set of points on the present time slice is coarsely uniformly distributed over the historical set of points on the present time slice. . Albert (2000, Ch. 4) rightly stresses this point in his approach to the PH. This only means that there are no correlations between the subset of trajectories which are historical (towards the past) and the subset of trajectories which are anti-thermodynamic (towards the future). In other words we don't want that the historical trajectories up to the present time t=0 (for any present time, or else we get a preferred time slice) be correlated with the future anti-thermodynamic trajectories that pass through the macrostate at t=0 (these trajectories are what Maudlin calls T-atypical). If there were such correlations, this would imply a selection of some preferred present moment, relative to which the correlation holds. In fact the absence of such correlations is highly plausible given the mixing dynamics implied by the DH anyway. 
The PH means that we know for some past time slices in the phase space of the universe the actual macrostates through which the trajectory of the universe passed. Since our memories are invariably local, the PH refers to the specific degrees of freedom which are epistemically accessible to us. It is of crucial importance to see that we don't infer the macroscopic behavior of local systems from the global macroscopic behavior of the universe but exactly the other way around: we conjecture the global behaviour on the basis of the scarce data we have concerning local observations. The PH boils down to accepting that our local memories and records are to be added by fiat to statistical mechanics, as Feynaman (1965?) seems to have suggested. Note that the locality of the PH immediately answers the objections of Winsberg (2003), Leeds (2003), Parker (2003) and others to Albert's formulation of the PH. 
The PH is very strong and very weak: it is a very strong epistemic statement (in the present paper we shall not address the justification or philosophical implications of this statement). At the same time, it is the weakest statement one could possibly make within science. Without the PH we have no empirical basis for our theories at all. An experiment is actually a comparison between what we now observe and what we now remember to have predicted or done in the past. All the empirical input of all the theories of science is based on the PH. (see more on this below.)
Since the input of science, and in particular of statistical mechanics, includes our memories and records, we hope to at least recover it back from our theories. Unfortunately, in the case of statistical mechanics we do not get this desideratum: the output of the theory says that the input of the theory is highly improbable! What we need to do is insert the same input again. Nothing more than that. 
It is important to realize already at this stage that the PH presupposes a direction of time. This is what is meant by taking our memories as reliable about the past. There is no empirical science at all without the empirical input, which has an arrow of time built into it.
Since we take the PH as fundamental in justifying our beliefs in statistical mechanics itself (as well as our beliefs in any other empirical theory), and since the PH assumes a direction of time, obviously one cannot explain non-circularly the direction of time on the basis of statistical mechanics (or any other physical theory). In other words, the best one can hope for in explaining the direction of time is a consistency argument which goes roughly as follows. On the basis of our experience which evidently includes a psychological arrow of time we construct physical and psychological and any other theory. From these theories we might be lucky enough one day to explain why it is that we have this particular experience of time direction. But since to begin with this explanation would rely on our time directed experience, the best we can get is a consistency argument.​[7]​
On the basis of the PH we conclude that the Boltzmannian retrodiction of the past is wrong. And so, the theory need be corrected, and we propose to inject into it the PH in addition to the Dynamical Hypothesis (DH) discussed above. Assuming the PH and the DH, it follows from the above analysis of the -1st law that the trajectories that started out in C at t=-1 arrive at t=0 to end points that are coarsely uniformly distributed over the accessible region. Due to Liouville's theorem this entails that most (in the standard measure) of the points in the accessible region at t=0 are non historical (as defined above). Nevertheless the DH also implies that the predictions of future macrostates conditional on the present macrostate can be made by the usual Boltzmannian approach, namely by conditioning on the present macrostates (as we explained above). This difference in the form of our inferences towards the future and towards the past immediately gives time asymmetry. Note that towards the past our inferences are not strictly speaking retrodictions. Rather, what we have is consistency between our memories (given the PH) and the distribution of the phase space points in the present.
What do we actually remember about the past? The sum total of all the present macro data about the past that is available to us is obviously local and limited in space and time. That is the available macro data is partial in the sense that it does not cover the remote past, and it covers only a small fraction of the universe in space and time. For example, some events that take place in the next room now may leave no macroscopic traces in the future, and there are certainly only very partial traces of the floods which took place on earth or of our ancestors. And so evidently the scope of our PH above is also partial and limited. We therefore have to postulate that the epistemically inaccessible parts of the universe are in fact similar in the relevant aspects to the accessible parts. 
Now, our direct experience, as well as the records and evidence that we accept as reliable, include both cases in which entropy increases and decreases. However, since we are in the business of recovering thermodynamics, we take it seriously, that is we are willing to accept its general statements as true (about overall positive entropy balance in the universe as stated by the -1st and 2nd laws), as long as we don't have evidence (or some other reasons) to the contrary (Callender 2001). 
Based on the above reasoning we put forward the following addition to the PH (call it GPH): 
The General Past Hypothesis (GPH): The global entropy of the universe in the remote past was significantly lower than it is today, and it has increased monotonically ever since. 
It is important to emphasize that the PH in our approach has an epistemic priority over the GPH, and therefore is to be preferred in any case of contradicting inferences. The GPH hinges on our scientific convictions and is tentative in this respect, unlike the PH which is the basis of all empirical science as such. However, as a matter of fact such contradiction is unlikely to arise since the information we have about the universe (which goes into the PH) is very partial. But in some cases the PH and the GPH might lead to inconsistent inferences about the past, and as we said in these cases we stipulate that the GPH will need to be altered in accordance with the PH. In fact, we selected the GPH and not any other conjecture because in general it does not contradict PH (or contradicts it less than other competing conjectures).
We now argue that it is possible to reconstruct statistical mechanics in a way that is consistent with both the PH and the GPH. The way to do it is roughly as follows. 
We start with the PH. In order to describe the content of PH within phase space we need to add a time axis to this space. This time axis as we use it has a direction in the sense that its past-to-future direction parallels our psychological arrow of time. But here we don't in fact add anything beyond the PH, as explained above. On each time slice of the phase space of the universe we select the macrostate that corresponds to the sum total of memories, records, etc., that pertain to this time. However, in each such time slice there are degrees of freedom of the universe about which we have no memories and no records. Moreover, there are also other time slices about which we have no records at all. To fill in these temporal and spatial gaps we use the GPH. That is, we select those macrostates which fit not only the PH but also the GPH. There may be more than one macrostate which satisfies these constrains on each time slice; we consider all of them as possible, and use the DH and the usual Bayesian conditional probabilities for updating in order to ascribe (future-directed) probabilities to them, i.e. the probability of each macrostate in this case will be proportional to its volume.
The trajectories of the universe evolve from one time slice to the next in accordance with the dynamical constraints applicable to these times, and with the DH. In particular, the trajectories satisfy Liouville's theorem, and as stipulated by the DH, the distribution of the historical points over the accessible region on each time slice (except perhaps the initial time; see below) is coarsely uniformly distributed. This guarantees that the predictions from each time slice to a future one are such that in the long run the relative frequencies confirm the Boltzmannian probabilities. This solves the minimum problem. As we proceed towards the future new information about the past becomes available, and more records are accumulated and need to get into the PH, and accordingly we must update the above construction. There need not be a time slice from which the construction is uniquely determined once and for all. Updating the PH is an ongoing process presumably ad infinitum or until the final time (should there be a final time) of the universe. 
		
II-2 The psychological direction of time. We want now to explain why in fact the PH is necessary: We believe that the PH is absolutely necessary for conducting empirical science in general. In order to make predictions based on a given theory and test these predictions experimentally, we must assume the reliability of our memories and records (see Albert's sceptic catastroph 2000, Ch. 4) in exactly the way stated in the PH. Otherwise we cut off the grounds for accepting statistical mechanics itself as an empirically confirmed theory. This sceptic paradox can even be generalized. In all cases where we take our scientific theories to be experimentally confirmed by our observations, we implicitly assume some version of the PH as construed above. Consider any experiment by which we normally take our best scientific theory to be empirically tested. It has the following structure. We fix some initial state for the test system, and then deduce from the laws of the theory together with the initial state the final state of the test system. Then we check by observation whether or not the final state of the test system is the one predicted by the theory under the constraints imposed by the initial state of the experiment. If we don't accept the PH as construed above, we cannot say that the prediction of the theory is confirmed by the experiment, since at the final time all we have are correlations between the final state of the directly observed 'pointer' observable, our memory or the records (at the final time) of the initial state of the system and of the initial state of the pointer, and the final state (at the final time) of the system. It would be meaningless to say that our theory has been confirmed experimentally by our testing experiments unless we presuppose that our memories (in the final or present time) of the initial state (in the past) are reliable states of affairs in the sense that they are taken to be causally connected to the existence of the states in the past as we remember them. Thus the PH as construed above seems to be the weakest version of the assumptions about the reliability of our memories and records, without which empirical science as we know it would be meaningless.]

II-3 The Branch Systems Approach. One remark about the branch systems approach seems to be in place. The basic idea of this approach is to dispense with the minimum problem, namely the problem that our retrodictions about past macrostates based on the Boltzmannian statistical postulates and the time reversal invariant dynamics do not match our records. According to this approach (see Reichenbach 1956, Davies 1977, p. 69) a branch comes into being at the moment a region of the world separates off from the rest of the universe (environment) and exists thereafter as a quasi-isolated system (and usually merges once again with the environment after a sufficient time). This proposal is meant to solve the minimum problem and also to underwrite the Boltzmannian statistical predictions to the future. But we argue that the branch system approach achieves neither of these aims. The minimum problem remains unsolved within each branch. In order to achieve both aims the branch system approach must treat each branch as a separate universe (for as long as it exists) and moreover apply all the machinery spelled out above (including the DH and the PH+GPH). For this reason we believe that the idea of branch systems is superfluous in statistical mechanics.

III. The Locality Hypothesis (LH) (Grue 2) 

We now wish to consider whether the above reconstruction of the Boltzmannian approach in statistical mechanics is sufficient in order to give the predictions we usually expect concerning the thermodynamic regularities, and to underwrite the Boltzmannian predictions. 

III-1 Locality. Consider the following set up. Suppose that far away in some galaxy a large scale entropy increase takes place. At the same time (in some reference frame) in our local laboratory an ice cube is spontaneously created in the glass of water before us. The total entropy of the universe has clearly increased and globally this is in accordance with Boltzmann's predictions and with the second law of thermodynamics. However, it is also clear that this scenario is unacceptable since we expect that the thermodynamic regularities will hold also locally (and indeed otherwise we would not have even discovered thermodynamics in the first place). An immediate response would be that the ice cube in the laboratory and the far away galaxy are two separate systems that are to be treated as two distinct universes in each of which the Boltzmannian probabilistic predictions ought to hold, and therefore the probability for the joint occurrence of these events is as low as the probability for the separate spontaneous creation of the ice cube.

This reply does not seem be conclusive. To see why consider the following set up as in Figure 6. Suppose that we place an ice cube of volume V and some water in a thermos at t=1, and at t=2 we find two ice cubes each of which is of volume V/4. We naturally assume that the two smaller ice cubes are remnants of the larger ice cube after it has partially melted. However, given Boltzmann's combinatorial reasoning another scenario is equally possible in principle: one of the small ice cubes is indeed a remnant of the bigger one, while the other has been spontaneously created from the water. In both scenarios the macrostates at t=1 and at t=2 are the same, but they differ in the way the final macrostate comes about. The only way to rule out the second scenario or to reduce its probability seems to be to treat the water and ice example exactly as the galaxy and ice example above. Namely, to treat the water and ice as two separate systems in each of which the Boltzmannian predictions ought to hold separately. This would imply that the probability of the second scenario is as low as the probability of a spontaneous creation of an ice cube in water. 
However, in the galaxy and ice example treating the galaxy and the ice as two separate universes seems natural. But in the water and ice example this is something that needs to be flashed out. The reason is that such a treatment can only be justified if we put forward dynamical conditions which amount to locality or even causation. Such conditions are not explicitly taken into account in the usual Boltzmannian combinatorial approach, but as we just saw they are necessary in order to give the right local predictions. These examples show that the naive Boltzmannian account based on purely combinatorial reasoning is not good enough, and that in order to get the thermodynamic behavior we have to inject into it some non trivial physical assumptions. 
To solve this problem we therefore propose the following variant on the DH: 
The Local Dynamical Hypothesis (LDH): For any degree of freedom, the starting-points of trajectories, that start out at some time t=0 in a region corresponding to a thermodynamic macrostate M, end up after a time interval ∆t in points that are distributed over the macrostates at t=T such that the measure of end-points of these trajectories, that end up in any macrostate N at t=T, is proportional to the measure of N (see Figure 2). Here ∆t is a time interval compatible with the time scales over which thermodynamic magnitudes typically change over time. In general ∆t depends on the special dynamics of the specific system in question. 




IV-1 Objective probability. We can now consider the notion of probability that is relevant in statistical mechanics. Obviously, probability arises in our set up as a result of partial information about the exact microstate of a system. If the trajectories of a system in the phase space are determined by a deterministic and time reversal invariant dynamics, and if the Hamiltonian is given, then the system's phase point a given time is sufficient to determine its trajectory for all times. This means that apart from issues of complexity and computation, knowledge of the system's phase point at a given time suffices to give complete predictions of the system's trajectory at all other (past and future) times. Here there are two points to be said. First, such complete knowledge is objectively impossible not only for macroscopic systems, but often also for microscopic ones, since in the usual case the initial conditions are only given with finite precision, while the trajectory is sensitive to minute differences in the initial conditions. Second, the fact that in classical statistical mechanics probabilities arise naturally in the face of partial information does not mean that the probabilities attached to macrostates (by phase space volume) are not objective in any interesting sense. Let's see how this comes about. 
In the above discussion we've assumed that we are given the usual observed frequencies of macrostates in thermodynamics, and we tried to impose conditions on the classical dynamics (the LDH) in a way that will yield the Boltzmann probabilities. Now we wish to turn the tables, and suppose that we already have the dynamics. What does the dynamics of the LDH imply about the probabilities? In fact we now argue that the probability measure we need in order to underwrite the Boltzmannian probabilities is derivable from (or better, suggested by) the dynamics (and the division to macrostates) in the following way. If the dynamics in classical mechanics is indeed given by something similar to the LDH, then given the division of the phase space into macrostates we can derive from the dynamics that trajectories with thermodynamic behavior are highly probable according to the standard Lebesgue measure. In fact, the uniform probability distribution on the standard measure according to which probability turns out to be given by phase space volume (as measured by the Lebesgue measure) is only one of the measures that will give us exactly the same conclusions regarding the typicality of the thermodynamic trajectories in the phase space of a classical system. This is true provided the measure we choose is absolutely continuous with the standard measure. 
In this way we can see that in classical statistical mechanics despite its underlying deterministic dynamical equations of motion the probabilities are objective in a way that is strikingly similar to chancy probabilities that arise in theories with genuinely stochastic dynamics (such as the GRW quantum theory). Note further that in this way the traditional questions about the status of probability measures over initial conditions (in deterministic theories) don't arise (see below)! 
Note that the DH is actually a hypothesis about the distribution of microstates compatible with the present macrostate. Nothing in this construction implies that at any suitable future time the probability distribution over past macrostates has to be uniform (nor do we need any such implication). The probability distribution over past macrostates can be any distribution you like provided that the dynamics yields trajectories which starting out in the past macrostate are distributed in a coarsely uniform way over the present accessible region in accordance with the LDH (so that the probability distribution over the end points of the historical trajectories in the present macrostate is approximately uniform).


IV-2 Probability of past events. A question concerning the PH and GPH remains. Recall that we distinguished between entropy and probability of a macrostate. The entropy of a macrostate is defined as proportional to phase space volume only, whereas the probability of the state is defined by the ratio between the entropy of the state and the volume of the accessible region. Consider the macrostates that go into the PH. On the one hand the PH commits us to the view that the macrostates that we remember have occurred with certainty. On the other, according to the above definition of probability of a macrostate, the probability of a macrostate is determined regardless of whether or not we remember it, or indeed whether or not it actually took place. These two aspects of past macrostates, however, are reconciled by our notion of probability as sketched above. The PH refers to matters of fact about entropy (as we remember them) and the GPH assumes that macrostates in the remote past had low entropy, but both do not refer to probability. The probability of the macrostates that go into both the PH and the GPH depends on the dynamical behavior of the external constraints which in turn determine the accessible region. In the case of the whole universe this dynamical behavior is the subject matter of theories such as cosmology.
As we said before we take the right notion of probability of states in the future (in both deterministic and indeterministic theories) in the Boltzmannian approach to bear on some form of inductive extrapolation of their relative frequency in the past. Obviously this notion of probability is time directed (regardless of the dynamics on which these probabilities are supposed to supervene). We consider all the known past states (whose number is finite) and assume that the relative frequencies in the future (even for finite future frequencies) will be the same as the relative frequencies in the past. As we proceed into the future the past set of states obviously changes, and we update our probabilities accordingly in the usual way (e.g. by conditionaliztion as in Bayes's theorem). In this way, the probability of a state in the past is determined by the relative frequencies in the series of states that preceded it. The fact that the states in the past actually took place does not change their probability in this sense. That is, the probability of past states does not become one just because past states have occurred, because the assignment of probabilities is always time directed (and parallels the time direction of the dynamical equations of motion). 
A special case of interest is the probability of the initial state in a given time series of states (e.g. the initial macrostate of the universe if cosmology turns out to confirm that the universe had an initial state). According to the notion of probability we propose here, the probability of the initial state is undefined, since, there are no past states that preceded the initial state. Supposing that an observer existed in the initial state of the universe, she could start with any arbitrary prior probabilities, and then by applying Bayes's theorem she is guaranteed that updating by conditionalization would yield probabilities of future states that approach the observed frequencies in the past. So in the case of long enough series of past states we can simply extrapolate the relative frequencies into the future. Boltzmann's conjecture is that there is a correlation between the probability of a macrostate defined by the ratio between phase space volumes and the relative frequencies in the future. By comparing our memories of relative frequencies of past macrostates and the Boltzmannian phase space volumes we can in fact experimentally test Boltzmann's conjecture. 
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